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Abstract
The novelty and creativity of DeepFake generation tech-
niques have attracted worldwide media attention. Many re-
searchers focus on detecting fake images produced by these
GAN-based image generation methods with fruitful results,
indicating that the GAN-based image generation methods are
not yet perfect. Many studies show that the upsampling pro-
cedure used in the decoder of GAN-based image generation
methods inevitably introduce artifact patterns into fake im-
ages. In order to further improve the fidelity of DeepFake im-
ages, in this work, we propose a simple yet powerful frame-
work to reduce the artifact patterns of fake images without
hurting image quality. The method is based on an important
observation that adding noise to a fake image can successfully
reduce the artifact patterns in both spatial and frequency do-
mains. Thus we use a combination of additive noise and deep
image filtering to reconstruct the fake images, and we name
our method FakeRetouch. The deep image filtering provides a
specialized filter for each pixel in the noisy image, taking full
advantages of deep learning. The deeply filtered images re-
tain very high fidelity to their DeepFake counterparts. More-
over, we use the semantic information of the image to gen-
erate an adversarial guidance map to add noise intelligently.
We conduct experiments on 3 state-of-the-art representative
DeepFake detection methods and fake images are generated
by 16 popular GAN-based DeepFake generation methods.
Our technique significantly reduces the accuracy of these 3
fake image detection methods, 36.79% on average and up to
97.02% in the worst case. Our method aims at improving the
fidelity of DeepFake images and exposing the problems of
existing DeepFake detection methods, and we hope that the
found vulnerabilities can help improve the future generation
DeepFake detection methods.
1 Introduction
Over the past few years, generative adversarial network
(GAN) achieves huge progress, which becomes a driving
force to boost techniques for information synthesis. Cur-
rently, fake images generated by GAN and its variants can
render both photo-realistic and high-fidelity effects. Al-
though the DeepFake phenomena recently received lots of
attention and social concerns, with media scrambling to
report the challenges for distinguishing DeepFake images
∗Qing Guo and Geguang Pu are the corresponding authors: ts-
ingqguo@gmail.com, ggpu@sei.ecnu.edu.cn.
Figure 1: In the DeepFake image (a), it shows clear checkerboard
pattern and visible artifact pattern in its spectrogram (red arrows).
(Top) Using deep image filtering to directly retouch the DeepFake
image will still leave artifacts and it can be caught by DeepFake
detectors (b). (Bottom) Through adding noise to the DeepFake im-
age, we can successfully reduce the artifact pattern (c). Then, deep
image filtering is able to restore the image quality without adding
artifacts (d), thus successfully evading DeepFake detectors.
from real ones (Sample 2020), the state-of-the-art GAN-
based fake image generation methods are still imperfect,
which stems from the upsampling modules in their decoders.
In particular, existing upsampling methods of GANs, e.g.,
transpose convolution, unpooling, and interpolation, often
inevitably introduce artifact patterns to the generated fake
images, occurring in both spatial-domain and frequency-
domain (e.g., spectrogram) representations. For example,
checkerboard patterns are typical textures that may be left
in the generated fake images. Similarly, typical artifact pat-
terns in the spectrogram of fake images are also discussed in
(Zhang, Karaman, and Chang 2019; Frank et al. 2020).
Through leveraging the potential artifact patterns as the
clue, up to the present, quite a few DeepFake detection meth-
ods have been proposed (Yu, Davis, and Fritz 2019; Wang
et al. 2019; Zhang, Karaman, and Chang 2019; Frank et al.
2020), which analyze the fake images from different angles.
These existing methods largely fall into three categories
according to their inputs: image-based, fingerprint-based,
and spectrum-based. Most of them have demonstrated their
effectiveness in successfully detecting fake images gener-
ated from the state-of-the-art GAN-based image generation
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methods. Our analysis reveals that the artifacts introduced by
existing DeepFake generation methods could be detrimental,
leaving a door open for effective detection.
To generate more photo-realistic and high-fidelity fake
images, one promising direction is to reduce the artifact pat-
terns and footprints introduced in fake images. To this end,
in this paper, we propose an automated framework, named
FakeRetouch, to retouch and refine the DeepFake images to
make them more “fake”. Our key observation is that adding
noise into fake images can reduce and to some extent destroy
the artifact patterns in both spatial and frequency domains of
the fake images. This provides a promising direction for us
to design a novel deep image filtering method to retouch the
fake images, reducing these fake artifacts. In particular, the
deep image filtering method enables us to effectively pro-
duce a specified kernel for each pixel of an image in a unique
way. More importantly, such a procedure does not introduce
unwanted extra artifacts. Through jointly combining the op-
erations of adding noise and deep image filtering, FakeRe-
touch can not only reduce the artifact patterns but also main-
tain the quality of fake images. Furthermore, to make the
noise even “smarter”, we also propose an adversarial guided
map to pinpoint the tentative locations to add the noises.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the very first work
based on deep learning that creates high-quality fake images
from the retouch and refinement perspective, which also ex-
hibits strong capability in penetrating state-of-the-art Deep-
Fake detectors. The new methods and findings of this paper
could be potentially helpful and guide us to think how to
design more effective DeepFake detection methods, towards
addressing the currently urgent social fake phenomena.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows.
• We propose a very first fake image retouch method based
on deep learning to reduce the artifact patterns. The re-
constructed fake images are both photo-realistic and have
a strong capability in bypassing SOTA fake detectors.
• To further improve the effectiveness of retouching, we
also propose a novel semantic-aware localization method
to pinpoint the places for noise addition.
• We perform a large-scale evaluation on 3 state-of-the-art
fake image detection methods and fake images generated
by a total of 16 popular DeepFake generation methods. In
particular, our retouched (i.e., reconstructed) fake images
can significantly reduce the fake detection accuracy of ex-
isting DeepFake detectors. The retouched images also ex-
hibit a high level of fidelity compared to its original fake
image counterpart.
• Our method indicates that existing detection methods
highly leverage the information of artifact patterns for
fake detection. The observation also raises an open ques-
tion of how to propose more general and effective Deep-
Fake detection techniques.
2 Related Work
2.1 GAN-based Image Generation
Since its advent (Goodfellow et al. 2014), adversarial neural
networks are extensively studied, with lots of GAN-based
image generation methods proposed in the past few years
(Karras et al. 2017; Karras, Laine, and Aila 2019; Karras
et al. 2019; Miyato et al. 2018; Li et al. 2017; He et al. 2019;
Choi et al. 2018; Liu et al. 2019; Choi et al. 2020). We dis-
cuss several recent GAN-based image generation methods
that can be most relevant to this paper.
ProGAN (Karras et al. 2017) proposes to synthesize high-
resolution images through growing both the generator and
discriminator, which achieves efficient and stable training
performance. StyleGAN (Karras, Laine, and Aila 2019) de-
signs a different generator architecture that leads to an au-
tomatically learned, unsupervised separation of high-level
attributes and stochastic variation in the generated images.
Based on StyleGAN, StyleGAN2 (Karras et al. 2019) fur-
ther proposes improvements on both model architecture
and training methods for better image generation quality.
SNGAN (Miyato et al. 2018) proposes a computationally
lightweight normalization method to stabilize and enhance
the training of the discriminator. Some GANs are also spe-
cially designed to manipulate facial attributes of real im-
ages. AttGAN (He et al. 2019) adopts an attribute detec-
tion constraint to the generated image instead of latent rep-
resentation to guarantee the correct change of desired at-
tributes. STGAN (Liu et al. 2019) selectively analyzes the
difference between target and source attribute vectors, and
adaptively selects and modifies the encoder feature for en-
hanced attribute editing. StarGAN (Choi et al. 2018) pro-
poses a novel and scalable approach that can perform image-
to-image translations for multiple domains using only a sin-
gle model. The images generated by StarGAN v2 (Choi et al.
2020) reach a level with high performance in terms of both
diversity and scalability over multiple domains.
2.2 DeepFake Detection Methods
(Tolosana et al. 2020) and (Verdoliva 2020) recently make
comprehensive surveys on the DeepFake detection methods
(Wang et al. 2020d; Qi et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2019; Afchar
et al. 2018; Nguyen, Yamagishi, and Echizen 2019; Nguyen
et al. 2019; Yu, Davis, and Fritz 2019; Zhang, Karaman, and
Chang 2019; Frank et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2020c). Overall,
they surveyed thirty-seven papers which focus on DeepFake
detection, all of which proposed CNN-based deep learn-
ing methods to solve the detection problem. These methods
largely fall into three categories depending on their feature
inputs: image-based methods, fingerprint-based methods,
and spectrum-based methods. As many CNN did, image-
based methods perform fake detection directly on the orig-
inal images (as inputs). Fingerprint-based methods mostly
follow the intuition that different GANs have various finger-
prints. Through analyzing the features of GAN fingerprints,
they can successfully detect fake images in many cases.
Spectrum-based methods take another perspective, which
considers the imperfection of fake images in the spectrum
area. They find that DeepFake artifacts are manifested as
replications of spectra in the frequency domain. Therefore,
they can use spectrum as the input of their network for more
effective fake image detection.
2
3 Methodology
3.1 Deep Image Filtering for FakeRetouch
Given a fake image I ∈ RH×W that is generated by some
DeepFake technique (e.g., ProGAN), we aim to produce a
new version of I (i.e., Iˆ ∈ RH×W ) by suppressing the ar-
tifact patterns introduced by that technique, retouching the
input fake image to make it more realistic.
This task is significantly challenging since the content of
fake images could be quite diverse and it is rather difficult
to employ DNNs to handle the image directly, which may
introduce new extra artifacts. To address the challenge, we
formulate the FakeRetouch as a general deep image filtering
problem, where the input image is processed by pixel-wise
kernels estimated from an offline trained DNN,
Iˆ = K~ I, (1)
with K = DNN(I), (2)
where DNN(·) denotes a UNet-like (Ronneberger, Fischer,
and Brox 2015) deep neural network used to predict the
pixel-wise kernels K ∈ RH×W×K2 . ~ denotes the pixel-
wise filtering. More specifically, the p-th pixel in the image
I is processed by the corresponding p-th kernel inK denoted
asKp ∈ RK×K , where K represents the kernel size. Then,
we can offline train the DNN with fake-real image pairs and
the L1 loss function.
Obviously, the aforementioned structure seems a feasible
and intuitive solution for FakeRetouch: First, the fake image
is processed by only one single-layer filtering without any
upsampling operations, avoiding the re-artifact risk. Second,
the kernels are generated from a DNN, which takes the full
advantage of deep learning in perceiving the image content
and predicting suitable kernels for each pixel.
However, naively training such a DNN for FakeRetouch,
unfortunately, often cannot reduce the artifacts, as con-
firmed in our evaluation. As shown in Fig. 1, the typical
artifact patterns of a DeepFake image can be visualized in
both spatial and spectrum domain. When employing the di-
rectly trained deep image filtering, i.e., Eq. 1 and 2, to the
image, we find that the artifacts cannot be easily reduced,
i.e., the trace indicated by red arrows in Fig. 1 (b). The same
conclusion is also reached on our large-scale evaluation (see
the experimental section), where the naive deep image filter-
ing fails to retouch the fake image and misjudge DeepFake
detectors. The large-scale experimental results confirm that
it is difficult to realize effective FakeRetouch via the single-
layer filtering even if the DNN is equipped.
Such results force us to rethink the retouching solu-
tion. Intuitively, the DNN-driven image filtering has demon-
strated big advantages for image denoising. Meanwhile,
noise can also be regarded as the perturbations in the spa-
tial domain. Therefore, we come up with a bold idea and
novel solution, which first employs noise to destroy the ar-
tifacts, and then recovers the deliberate noisy image with
the DNN-driven image filtering. In the following, we present
how to realize this idea with the guidance of random noise
(i.e., Sec. 3.2). Moreover, we further propose an advanced
version by employing the popular adversarial attack to gen-
erate semantic-aware noise for guidance (i.e., Sec. 3.3).
real fake noise deeply filtered
Figure 2: This is a simple example to show our observation that
adding noise to a fake image can reduce its artifact patterns.
In the first row, the images in turn are real image, fake image,
noised image and deeply filtered image based on the noised im-
age. The second row shows the spectrum of these images. We can
clearly see that artifact patterns (bright blobs at 1/4 and 3/4 of the
width/height) in the spectrum of the fake image. The noised image
shows the result of adding Gaussian noise with a standard deviation
of 5 and a mean of 0 to the fake image. It does not have blobs in the
spectrum. In addition, the deeply filtered image using deep image
filtering on the noised image also exhibits no artifact patterns.
3.2 Random-Noise-Guided Image Filtering
We first give a simple example to explain that adding ran-
dom noise can effectively reduce the artifacts. As shown in
Fig. 2, DeepFake techniques can corrupt the spectrum of the
real face image and introduce the bright blob patterns shown
in the spectrum of the fake image. After adding zero-mean
Gaussian noise with the standard deviation of 5 to the fake
image, surprisingly, the artifacts in the spectrum are reduced.
In particular, we first propose the random-noise-guided im-
age filtering method. Given a fake image I, we add random
noise to it and process it with pixel-wise kernels, thus we
can reformulate Eq. 1 as
Iˆ = K~ (I+Nσ), (3)
where Nσ denotes the Gaussian noise map with standard
deviation σ and has the same size with I. Then, we can em-
ploy the same network in Eq. 2 to predict the kernels, which
is offline trained with the fake-real image pairs and L1 loss.
As shown in Fig. 2, with the random-noise-guided image
filtering, both the artifacts and deliberate noise are clearly re-
duced, i.e., the spectrum of the deeply filtered image is clean
and similar to the real one. Nevertheless, as a kind of degra-
dation, the random noise can potentially reduce the image
quality. Ideally, it is highly desirable the noise addition is as
minor as possible, at the same time, removing fake artifacts
effectively. As a result, the fake can not be detected by the
advanced DeepFake Detectors. This requires the noise addi-
tion method to be ‘smart’ or semantic-aware, i.e., adding the
noise to the proper locations.
3.3 Adversarial-Noise-Guided Image Filtering
Inspired by adversarial attacks, which performs semantic-
aware and sparse noise perturbation, we further propose the
adversarial-noise-guided image filtering, where a DeepFake
detection method is employed as a subject model to generate
3
Algorithm 1: FakeRetouch
Input: Fake images Ir, DeepFake detection method D(·),
Ground truth label y of fake images, Cross-entropy
loss function J(·), Noise mapNσ , Pixel-wise kernels
K.
Output: Reconstruction image Iˆ.
1 for i = 1 to |Ir| do
2 Sample an image I ∼ {Ir};
3 Generate adversarial noise mapA via
argmaxA J(D(I+A), y) + ‖A‖1;
4 Produce I
′
by adding noise to image I via
I
′
= I+ANσ;
5 Apply image filtering to achieve reconstruction image Iˆ
from I
′
via Iˆ = K~ I′ ;
the adversarial noise and aL1 constraint is used to reduce the
noise strength.
In particular, based on Eq. 3, we retouch the fake image I
via the guidance of an adversarial noise map and obtain
Iˆ = K~ (I+ANσ), (4)
where denotes the element-wise multiplication andA is a
binary adversarial noise map with value ‘1’ for adding noise
Nσ to the fake image.
It is highly desirable that A is sparse, while pinpoint-
ing key positions that could fool a DeepFake detector when
their intensities change. To this end, we calculate A from
the viewpoint of adversarial attack and employ a DeepFake
detector (i.e., D(·)) as a subject model. Then, we have the
following objective function
argmax
A
J(D(I+A), y) + ‖A‖1, (5)
where J(·) denotes the cross-entropy loss function, y is the
ground truth label of I. Here, we have y = 1 since I is a fake
image. The second term encourages A to be sparse to add
less noise to the fake image.
3.4 Algorithm for FakeRetouch
The algorithm of our method is shown in Algorithm 1. It
totally has four steps. First, we select a fake image from the
fake image list. Second, we need an adversarial guided map
produced by attacking a DeepFake detector. Third, we add
the noise to the fake image with the guidance of the previous
map. At last, the specified kernels generated by deep neural
networks are efficiently used to embellish the noised image.
4 Experiments
We design two different validation methods to demonstrate
the effectiveness of our method. The relevant settings are
presented in section 4.1. First, we test whether the recon-
structed images can reduce the detection accuracy of var-
ious fake image detection methods. This allows uncover-
ing the relationship between these detection methods and
the artifacts (i.e., manipulation footprint). The experiments
are introduced in section 4.2, 4.3, 4.4. Then, we further per-
form quantitative measurement of our reconstructed chang-
ing magnitude by using three similarity metrics, i.e., cosine
similarity, peak signal-to-noise ratio, and structural similar-
ity. The discussions are shown in section 4.5.
4.1 Experimental Setup
Fake Detection Methods As discussed, existing fake im-
age detection methods largely fall into 3 categories. To be
representative, for each category, we choose one state-of-
the-art fake detection method. For fingerprint-based, image-
based and spectrum-based method, we select GANFinger-
print (Yu, Davis, and Fritz 2019), CNNDetector (Wang
et al. 2019) and DCTA (Frank et al. 2020), respectively.
Datasets We tried our best to cover diverse datasets and
select 3 datasets that are used in previous work, including
CelebA (Liu et al. 2018), LSUN (Yu et al. 2015), FFHQ
(Karras, Laine, and Aila 2019) CelebA and FFHQ are the
most famous human face dataset while LSUN includes im-
ages of different rooms such as classrooms, bedrooms, etc.
Following previous works, we comprehensively tried a to-
tal of 16 GAN-based methods for fake image generation on
the above real image datasets. Specifically, for GANFinger-
print and DCTA, ProGAN (Karras et al. 2017), SNGAN
(Miyato et al. 2018), CramerGAN (Bellemare et al. 2017)
and MMDGAN (Li et al. 2017) are used as the fake image
generator. For each of these four GAN-based image genera-
tion method, we set the the size of the testing dataset to be
10,000. For CNNDetector, we select ProGAN, StyleGAN
(Karras, Laine, and Aila 2019) , BigGAN (Brock, Don-
ahue, and Simonyan 2018), CycleGAN (Zhu et al. 2017),
StarGAN (Choi et al. 2018), GauGAN (Park et al. 2019),
CRN (Shi, Bai, and Yao 2016), IMLE (Li and Malik 2018),
SITD (Chen et al. 2018), SAN (Dai et al. 2019), DeepFakes
(Ro¨ssler et al. 2019), StyleGAN2 (Karras et al. 2019), and
Whichfaceisreal (Jevin West 2019), a total of 13 GAN-based
image generation methods. The size of the testing dataset
of these GAN-based image generation methods range from
hundreds to thousands. The elements in the datasets of Cy-
cleGAN, ProGAN, StyleGAN and StyleGAN2 have two or
more categories (e.g., in StyleGAN2, four different cate-
gories (horse, car, cat, church) are contained).
Evaluation Settings In our experiment, we use KPN
(Mildenhall et al. 2018) as the deep image filtering method
to process the image. The training dataset of KPN has
10,000 pairs of images, each pair of which includes a real
image chosen from CelebA and a fake image. The fake im-
age is first produced by reconstructing the counterpart real
image with STGAN (Liu et al. 2019), and then is added with
different types of noise. The kernel size of KPN is 9.
We choose two classical noises (i.e., Gaussian noise and
uniform noise). The mean of Gaussian noise is 0 while the
standard deviation is 10. The lower bound and upper bound
of uniform noise are -20 and 20, respectively.
To add deliberate noise, we first train a DeepFake detec-
tor with ResNet50. Then, we use PGD (Madry et al. 2017) to
adversarially attack the detector, on the GAN-based fake im-
ages as the input to obtain an adversarial guided map. The
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Accuracy(%) ProGAN (Pro) SNGAN (SN)CelebA Pro SN Cramer MMD CelebA Pro SN Cramer MMD
Fake 0.03 99.91 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.01 99.75 0.05 0.12
BL-PCA 88.90 (+88.87) 6.99 (-92.92) 0.21 (+0.20) 0.07 (+0.04) 3.83 (+3.81) 46.10 (+46.03) 0.12 (+0.11) 50.86 (-48.89) 0.16 (+0.11) 2.76 (+2.64)
BL-KSVD 21.50 (+21.47) 78.10 (-21.81) 0.10 (+0.09) 0.20 (+0.17) 0.10 (+0.08) 48.15 (+48.08) 4.60 (+4.59) 46.35 (-53.40) 0.60 (+0.55) 0.30 (+0.18)
FR(nn) 0.03 (0) 99.91 (0) 0.01 (0) 0.03 (0) 0.02 (0) 0.95 (+0.88) 0.62 (+0.61) 97.06 (-2.69) 0.93 (+0.88) 0.44 (+0.32)
FR(rn)-gau 93.39 (+93.36) 4.77 (-95.14) 0.14 (+0.13) 0.21 (+0.18) 1.49 (+1.47) 53.59 (+53.52) 0.05 (+0.04) 45.22 (-54.53) 0.13 (+0.08) 1.01 (+0.89)
FR(rn)-uni 91.79 (+91.76) 6.57 (-93.34) 0.11 (+0.10) 0.20 (+0.17) 0.22 (+0.20) 66.42 (+66.35) 0.16 (+0.15) 31.82 (-67.93) 0.21(+0.16) 1.39 (+1.27)
FR(an)-uni 95.76 (+95.73) 2.89 (-97.02) 0.16 (+0.15) 0.12 (+0.09) 1.07 (+1.05) 75.17 (+75.10) 0.07 (+0.06) 23.69 (-76.07) 0.09 (+0.04) 0.98 (+0.86)
Accuracy(%) CramerGAN (Cramer) MMDGAN (MMD)CelebA Pro SN Cramer MMD CelebA Pro SN Cramer MMD
Fake 0.00 0.02 0.02 99.76 0.20 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.27 99.57
BL-PCA 54.85 (+54.85) 0.35 (+0.33) 0.93 (+0.91) 35.07 (-64.69) 8.80 (+8.60) 45.94 (+45.83) 0.13 (+0.12) 0.20 (+0.16) 0.03 (-0.24) 53.70 (-45.87)
BL-KSVD 28.70 (+28.70) 14.90 (+14.88) 0.10 (+0.08) 55.60 (-44.16) 0.70 (+0.50) 47.40 (+47.29) 14.20 (+14.19) 0.30 (+0.26) 0.70 (+0.43) 37.40 (-62.17)
FR(nn) 0.01 (+0.01) 0.11 (+0.09) 0.03 (+0.01) 99.69 (-0.07) 0.16 (-0.04) 0.23 (+0.12) 0.11 (+0.10) 0.11 (+0.07) 1.46 (+1.19) 98.09 (-1.48)
FR(rn)-gau 66.18 (+66.18) 0.29 (+0.27) 0.71 (+0.69) 29.71 (-70.05) 3.11 (+2.91) 69.96 (+69.85) 0.10 (+0.09) 0.24 (+0.20) 0.15 (-0.12) 29.55 (-70.02)
FR(rn)-uni 70.13 (+70.13) 0.55 (+0.53) 0.51 (+0.49) 25.89 (-73.87) 2.92 (+2.72) 74.00 (+73.89) 0.20 (+0.19) 0.30 (+0.26) 0.10 (-0.17) 25.40 (-74.43)
FR(an)-uni 81.54 (+81.54) 0.16(+0.14) 0.56 (+0.54) 15.22 (-84.54) 2.52 (+2.32) 83.42 (+83.31) 0.09 (+0.08) 0.17 (+0.13) 0.04 (-0.23) 16.28 (-83.29)
Table 1: Detection accuracy before & after reconstruction of GAN-synthesized images in GANFingerprint.
Accuracy(%)
Fake 88.99
FR(rn)-gau 22.59 (-66.4)
FR(rn)-uni 21.73 (-67.26)
FR(an)-uni 21.64 (-67.35)
Table 2: Detection accuracy before and after reconstruction of
GAN-synthesized images in DCTA.
epsilon (maximum distortion of adversarial example com-
pared to original input) is 0.04. The eps iter (step size for
each attack iteration) is 0.001 while the nb iter (number of
attack iterations) is 50. At last, depending on the adversarial
guided map, we choose locations of the fake images to add
Gaussian or uniform noise.
Metrics Detection accuracy is one of our main evaluation
metrics. We compare the detection accuracy of fake images
and reconstructed images for each method. In addition, to
be comprehensive, we further use cosine similarity (COSS),
peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR), and structural similar-
ity (SSIM) to measure the similarity between a fake image
and its reconstructed image counterpart. COSS is a com-
mon similarity metric that measures the cosine of the angle.
We transform the RGB images to vectors before calculating
COSS. PSNR is a widely used measurement for the recon-
struction quality of lossy compression. SSIM is one of the
most popular and useful metrics for measuring the similar-
ity between two images. A large value of COSS, PSNR and
SSIM, indicates the better result. All the experiments were
run on an Ubuntu 16.04 system with an Intel(R) Xeon(R)
CPU E5-2699 with 196 GB of RAM, equipped with a Nvidia
Tesla V100 GPU of 32G RAM.
4.2 Experiment I: Evading GANFingerprint
GANFingerprint can not only detect fake images with high
accuracy, but also judge which GAN-based image genera-
tion method is used to produce the fake image. For a double
check and validate our settings, we reproduce their experi-
ments on fake image detection. For each GAN-based fake
image generation method (i.e., ProGAN, SNGAN, Cramer-
GAN, MMDGAN), we produce 10,000 fake images from
10,000 randomly chosen CelebA real images. Furthermore,
we replace their fake images with our reconstructed images
to test the detection accuracy of their method.
Table 1 summarizes the detection accuracy of different
GANs. Here, we use the ProGAN (Pro) in the second col-
umn as an example for elaboration. In particular, Pro has
five sub-items (columns): CelebA, ProGAN (Pro), SNGAN
(SN), CramerGAN (Cramer), MMDGAN (MMD). These
sub-items represent the possibilities of the ProGAN images
to be classified as one of them. In the first column, Fake,
FR(nn), FR(rn)-gau, FR(rn)-uni, FR(an)-uni, BL-PCA,
and BL-KSVD represent the source of input images. Fake
represents the fake images. FR is our method FakeRetouch.
FR(nn) is the reconstructed images with no noise (nn)
added. FR(rn)-gau means the reconstructed images are pro-
duced by adding and denoising random-noise-guided (rn)
Gaussian noise (gau) on the full region of counterpart fake
images. Similarly, FR(rn)-uni represents the same method
with uniform noise (uni). To further show the performance
of adversarial-noise-guided image filtering, we use FR(an)-
uni as an example. FR(an)-uni means adding adversarial-
noise-guided (an) deliberate uniform noise on local region
of fake images. Since the guided noise only uses partial re-
gions of the fake image to add noise, we increased the inten-
sity of the noise to match the total tensity of FR(rn)-uni. In
Table 1, FR(an)-uni uses 80% of the area to add uniform
noise, thus the lower and upper bounds of uniform noise
are 1.25 times (-25/25) of that in FR(rn)-uni (-20/20). BL
represents the baseline referenced from (Huang et al. 2020).
They use shallow reconstruction method to polish fake im-
ages. BL-PCA and BL-KSVD are their PCA-based recon-
struction and KSVD-based reconstruction, respectively.
In the Fake row, the input images are 10,000 ProGAN
fake images. We can find that 99.91% of the fake images
have been considered as being produced by Pro. The per-
centage of the ProGAN fake images that are misclassified as
CelebA, SN, Cramer and MMD are 0.03%, 0.01%, 0.03%
and 0.02%. The detection accuracy demonstrates the ef-
fectiveness of GANFingerprint method. In the table, we
highlight the difference in detection accuracy between re-
constructed images and fake images (e.g., by color and
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Accuracy(%)/AP ProGAN StyleGAN BigGAN CycleGAN StarGAN GauGAN CRN IMLE SITD SAN DeepFakes StyleGAN2 Whichfaceisreal
pr
ob
0.
1 Real & Fake 99.9/99.9 87.1/99.6 70.2/84.5 85.2/93.5 91.7/98.2 78.9/89.5 86.3/98.2 86.2/98.4 90.3/97.2 50.5/70.5 53.5/89.0 84.4/99.1 83.6/93.2
Real 100/- 99.9/- 93.5/- 91.5/- 96.7/- 93.0/- 72.7/- 72.7/- 93.9/- 99.1/- 99.9/- 99.9/- 92.9/-
Fake 99.9/- 74.2/- 46.8/- 78.8/- 86.7/- 64.8/- 99.8/- 99.8/- 86.7/- 1.83/- 6.86/- 68.8/- 74.3/-
FR(rn)-gau 96.8 (-3.1)/- 28.6 (-45.6)/- 25.0 (-21.8)/- 61.8 (-17.0)/- 43.2 (-43.5)/- 36.9 (-27.9)/- 10.5(-89.3)/- 20.2 (-79.6)/- 86.7 (0)/- 7.76 (+5.93)/- 3.04 (-3.82)/- 37.0 (-31.8)/- 2.90 (-71.4)/-
FR(rn)-uni 95.3 (-4.6)/- 19.9 (-54.3)/- 21.7 (-25.1)/- 60.9(-17.9)/- 33.8 (-52.9)/- 29.9 (-34.9)/- 4.95 (-34.9)/- 15.8 (-84.0)/- 85.6 (-1.10)/- 6.85 (+5.02)/- 1.82 (-5.04)/- 25.3 (-43.5)/- 4.10 (-70.2)/-
pr
ob
0.
5 Real & Fake 100/100 73.4/98.5 59.0/88.2 80.8/96.8 81.0/95.4 79.3/98.1 87.6/98.9 94.1/99.5 78.3/92.7 50.0/63.9 51.1/66.3 68.4/98.0 63.9/88.8
Real 100/- 99.9/- 99.1/- 98.6/- 99.3/- 99.4/- 99.2/- 99.2/- 92.8/- 100/- 99.4/- 99.9/- 99.2/-
Fake 100/- 46.9/- 18.9/- 62.9/- 62.7/- 59.2/- 76.0/- 88.9/- 63.9/- 0.00/- 2.52/- 36.9/- 28.6/-
FR(rn)-gau 98.5 (-1.5)/- 17.0(-29.9)/- 9.15 (-9.75)/- 41.9 (-21.0)/- 27.5 (-35.2)/- 37.5 (-21.7)/- 2.16(-73.84)/- 8.95 (-79.95)/- 86.1 (+22.2)/- 1.37 (+1.37)/- 2.82(+0.30)/- 15.0 (-21.9)/- 7.90 (-20.7)/-
FR(rn)-uni 97.9 (-2.1)/- 14.2 (-32.7)/- 9.10 (-9.8)/- 41.9 (-21.0)/- 25.0 (-37.7)/- 34.5 (-24.7)/- 1.55 (-74.45)/- 8.02 (-80.88)/- 83.3 (+19.4)/- 2.28 (+2.28)/- 2.48 (-0.04)/- 13.3 (-23.6)/- 9.70 (-18.9)/-
Table 3: Detection accuracy before & after reconstruction of GAN-synthesized images in CNNDetecion
BigGan DeepFakes GauGAN IMLE SAN SITD StarGAN Whichfaceisreal CycleGAN StyleGAN StyleGAN2
- person - road - - person person horse zebra winter orange apple summer bedroom car cat horse church car cat
FR(rn)-gau
COSS 0.997 0.999 0.997 0.999 0.994 0.988 0.999 0.997 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.998 0.997 0.996 0.998 0.995 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.996 0.999
PSNR 28.95 32.73 28.93 32.02 27.19 28.09 32.10 28.82 30.11 28.94 28.44 29.67 29.56 28.22 29.88 26.85 30.61 29.51 27.43 27.61 31.87
SSIM 0.917 0.976 0.910 0.971 0.877 0.857 0.929 0.873 0.943 0.933 0.909 0.928 0.895 0.903 0.938 0.870 0.937 0.929 0.909 0.888 0.960
FR(rn)-uni
COSS 0.996 0.999 0.996 0.998 0.993 0.987 0.998 0.997 0.998 0.997 0.996 0.998 0.997 0.995 0.998 0.994 0.998 0.997 0.996 0.996 0.999
PSNR 28.47 32.44 28.38 31.27 26.55 27.74 31.83 28.57 29.43 28.14 27.96 29.76 29.25 27.73 29.26 26.30 30.16 28.93 26.89 27.04 31.31
SSIM 0.907 0.975 0.900 0.965 0.863 0.853 0.926 0.867 0.932 0.920 0.899 0.913 0.884 0.892 0.930 0.856 0.931 0.917 0.894 0.875 0.955
ProGAN CRN
airplane motorbike tvmonitor horse sofa car pottedplant diningtable sheep bottle person train dog cow bicycle cat bird boat chair bus road
FR(rn)-gau
COSS 0.998 0.996 0.997 0.997 0.998 0.997 0.996 0.997 0.997 0.998 0.997 0.997 0.998 0.997 0.996 0.998 0.997 0.997 0.998 0.997 0.999
PSNR 29.83 27.35 28.84 28.44 29.92 28.22 27.65 28.26 28.27 29.63 29.09 28.03 29.50 28.42 27.26 29.84 29.16 28.34 29.65 27.81 31.01
SSIM 0.947 0.922 0.917 0.918 0.942 0.916 0.920 0.921 0.908 0.930 0.920 0.916 0.927 0.909 0.918 0.930 0.933 0.922 0.938 0.920 0.966
FR(rn)-uni
COSS 0.998 0.996 0.997 0.997 0.998 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.997 0.997 0.996 0.997 0.997 0.995 0.998 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.996 0.998
PSNR 29.11 26.63 28.06 27.80 29.15 27.47 26.87 27.43 27.69 28.92 28.50 27.31 28.98 27.83 26.49 29.28 28.58 27.57 28.73 27.00 30.27
SSIM 0.940 0.911 0.909 0.906 0.933 0.905 0.905 0.908 0.895 0.921 0.912 0.902 0.919 0.897 0.904 0.923 0.923 0.910 0.928 0.907 0.958
Table 4: Similarity between fake image & reconstructed image of GANs in CNNDetection.
number). As shown in the FR(rn)-gau row, the inputs are
the reconstructed images by adding and denoising random-
noise-guided Gaussian noise on the counterpart fake images.
Most of the 10,000 reconstructed images are considered as
CelebA type. The accuracy raises from 0.03% to 93.39%.
We use blue color and (+93.36) to highlight the difference.
Similarly, the ratio of images classified into Pro decreases
from 99.91% to 4.77%. We use red color and (-95.14) to
show the difference. We can see that most of the fake im-
ages generated by ProGAN are misclassified to be real im-
ages after using our method. Similar conclusions could also
be reached for the other three GAN-based image generation
methods. FR(rn)-gau, FR(rn)-uni and FR(an)-uni recon-
struction reduces all of their detection accuracy effectively.
In these three categories, FR(an)-uni achieves the best per-
formance. For each of ProGAN, SNGAN, CramerGAN and
MMDGAN, it misjudges the detector by 3%, 15%, 13%, and
11% on average more than the other two types.
As discussed in Sec 3, directly using the deep image fil-
tering method is unable to reduce the artifact patterns. In
Table 1 gives more comprehensive results. The performance
of FR(nn) is very similar to that of using fake images as
inputs. We highlight the best performance of the reconstruc-
tion method of all the four GANs in bold font. The results of
FR(an)-uni are much better than other all the methods.
4.3 Experiment II: Evading DCTA
DCTA has the same testing dataset asGANFingerprint. We
follow the exact same evaluation setting as its original paper.
ProGAN SNGAN CramerGAN MMDGAN
FR(rn)-gau
COSS 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998
PSNR 30.26 30.21 30.18 30.26
SSIM 0.933 0.932 0.933 0.936
FR(rn)-uni
COSS 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998
PSNR 29.91 29.86 29.79 29.88
SSIM 0.928 0.926 0.927 0.930
FR(an)-uni
COSS 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998
PSNR 29.73 29.68 29.61 29.70
SSIM 0.925 0.924 0.924 0.927
Table 5: Similarity between fake image & reconstructed image of
GANs in GANFingerprint & DCTA.
In particular, they use the spectrum of the images as inputs.
For each category of CelebA, ProGAN, SNGAN, Cramer-
GAN and MMDGAN, we use 9,600 fake images as the in-
put. The testing dataset is a total of 48,000 images.
As shown in Table 2, DCTA successfully detects fake im-
ages with a high accuracy of 88.99%. However, on our re-
constructed images, it decreases significantly. DCTA only
obtains 22.59% accuracy on FR(rn)-gau reconstructed im-
ages, at a dramatically drop of 66.4%. For FR(rn)-uni re-
construction, it shows to be slightly better (21.73%) than
FR(rn)-gau reconstruction. FR(an)-uni achieves the best
performance of these three types. The experimental results
demonstrate the effectiveness of our reconstructed images in
misleading the fake detectors.
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fake FR(rn)-gau FR(rn)-uni
Figure 3: Here are the reconstructed images of different categories.
In the first row, the images in turn are fake image, FR(rn)-gau re-
constructed image and FR(rn)-uni reconstructed image of cat. The
fake image is produced by StyleGAN (Karras, Laine, and Aila
2019). The images in the second row are the images of person.
The fake image is produced by ProGAN (Karras et al. 2017).
4.4 Experiment III: Evading CNNDetector
We further perform a large-scale evaluation on CNNDetec-
torwith a total of 13 GAN-based image generation methods.
The testing dataset of CNNDetector contains diverse types
of images (e.g., animals, human faces, road). For each GAN
category, the size of the testing dataset ranges from hundreds
to thousands, each of which contains the same number of
fake images and real images. In our evaluation, we follow
the metrics used in the original paper of CNNDetector, i.e.,
detection accuracy, and average precision (AP).
As shown in the first column of Table 3, the two mod-
els used by CNNDetector are blur jpg prob0.1 (prob0.1)
and blur jpg prob0.5 (prob0.5), which achieve competi-
tive accuracy on most of the GANs. We take the case
blur jpg prob0.1 as an example to introduce the table. In
the first row, Real & Fake is the testing dataset (i.e., the
same testing dataset as used in CNNDetector), which con-
tains both real images and fake images. Note that the number
of real images and fake images is the same.
However, this testing dataset is unable to show the de-
tailed performance of CNNDetector on the fake image, as
well as real images. Thus, we further design two extra ex-
periments for real images and fake images only. Real and
Fake in the second and third row are the corresponding input
types. We can see that the CNNDetector works well in de-
tecting real images but becomes inaccurate in detecting fake
images. Although it achieves high accuracy on some GANs
(e.g., ProGAN, StarGAN, CRN), its performance drops sig-
nificantly on SAN and DeepFakes.
FR(rn)-gau and FR(rn)-uni in the fourth and fifth row
are different noise types in the reconstruction procedure of
our method. Compared with the detection accuracy of fake
images, FR(rn)-gau and FR(rn)-uni reconstructed images
also drop the accuracy of CNNDetector.
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Figure 4: Comparison between deliberate noise and random noise.
α represents the percentage of the region in the image where noise
is added. γ means the possibility of reconstructed images being
classified as CelebA types by method GANFingerprint.
4.5 Discussion
Similarity between fake image and reconstructed image
Table 5 summarizes the similarity between fake images and
reconstructed images. For each of FR(rn)-gau, FR(rn)-uni
and FR(an)-uni, we use three metrics (COSS, PSNR, SSIM)
to demonstrate the similarity. The values of COSS and SSIM
of all the GANs are close to 1, indicating high similarity
between fake images and reconstructed images. The values
of PSNR are also very high, which means our reconstructed
images are very similar to fake images counterparts.
For CNNDetector, the similarity of FR(rn)-gau/FR(rn)-
uni reconstructed images and fake images is summarized in
Table 4, where 13 GANs have different subclasses. Among
these, five GANs contains only one category. The images in
DeepFakes, StarGAN, and Whichfaceisreal are all persons
while the images in IMLE and crn are both roads. The other
eight GANs have multiple categories. The images of Cy-
cleGAN, StyleGAN, StyleGAN2, and ProGAN are sorted
into categories, they use different folders to store different
categories of images. The other GANs (BigGAN, GauGAN,
SAN, SITD) combine images of different categories into one
folder. We use ‘-’ to represent this category. We can find
that the reconstructed images in CNNDetector are also very
similar to their fake image counterparts.
Figure 3 gives reconstructed image examples of our
method, on a cat and a human, respectively. The quality of
reconstructed images are very high.
Discussion on deliberate noise Figure 4 shows the per-
formance between deliberate noise and random noise of the
same noise setting (i.e., uniform noise with 20 upper bound
and -20 lower bound). The horizontal axis of all the four
subfigures represents the percentage of the region ratio of
the image, on which the noise is added. The vertical axis
is the possibility of reconstructed images being classified as
CelebA types by method GANFingerprint. The blue and
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orange lines represent the performance of deliberate noise
and random noise, respectively. Deliberate noise is added by
using our localization method while random noise is ran-
domly added into the image. We can observe that in all the
four GANs and among the different percentage of regions,
the accuracy of deliberate noise is better than that of random
noise. This indicates that deliberate noise leads to a higher
error rate of the detector, confirming that our localization
method is stable and effective.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose the FakeRetouch, a framework
that takes a hybrid approach of deep image filtering and
noise addition to improve the fidelity of GAN-based fake
images. Our method effectively reduces and destroys the ar-
tifact patterns introduced by existing fake image generation
methods, in both spatial and frequency domain. Through re-
moving fake artifacts, our further reconstructed image re-
tains photo-realistic and high-fidelity, and can bypass state-
of-the-art DeepFake detection methods as well as DeepFake
provenance method (Wang et al. 2020b). Our results demon-
strate that more general DeepFake detectors beyond lever-
aging fake artifacts should be further investigated. In future
studies, it is also worthwhile to investigate how the pro-
posed FakeRetouch method can play a role in mitigating
various adversarial attacks, especially when the attacks are
not purely based on additive adversarial noise such as (Guo
et al. 2020a; Cheng et al. 2020a; Wang et al. 2020a; Guo
et al. 2020b; Gao et al. 2020; Cheng et al. 2020b; Tian et al.
2020; Zhai et al. 2020).
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